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Environmental Tribalism
Douglas A. Kysar t and James Salzman"
INTRODUCTION
In August 2001, the prestigious academic publishing
house, Cambridge University Press, launched a book called The
Skeptical Environmentalist.1 Written by Bjorn Lomborg, an
Associate Professor of Statistics at the University of Aarhus in
Denmark, the book challenged popular perceptions that the
global environment is getting worse. Lomborg argued that
concerns we hear over the "Litany" of environmental harmsloss of biodiversity, climate change, overpopulation,
2
deforestation, etc.-are not supported by the evidence.
Contrary to claims by environmental groups reported in the
popular press, "our problems are getting smaller and not
bigger, and... frequently the offered solutions are grossly
inefficient."3 Bolstering his views on the "Real State of the
t Assistant Professor of Law, Cornell Law School.
tt Professor of Law, Washington College of Law, American University.
The authors are grateful for the insights of John Baden and Pete Geddes, who
suggested the metaphors of cutting gates and tribalism. Helpful comments
were also generously provided by Dan Farber, J.B. Ruhl, Todd Zywicki, and
Sandy Gaines. David Gacioch provided excellent research assistance.
1. BJoRN LOMBORG, THE SKEPTICAL ENVIRONMENTALIST: MEASURING
THE REAL STATE OF THE WORLD (2001).

2. See id. at 329. Lomborg states that
[we will not lose our forests; we will not run out of energy, raw
materials, or water. We have reduced atmospheric pollution in the
cities of the developed world and have good reason to believe that this
will also be achieved in the developing world. Our oceans have not
been defiled, our rivers have become cleaner and support more
life ....Nor is waste a particularly big problem.
The problem of the ozone layer has been more or less solved. The
current outlook on the development of global warming does not
indicate a catastrophe ....And, finally, our chemical worries and
fear of pesticides are misplaced and counterproductive.
Id.
e.g.,

3. Id. at 5. Lomborg is by no means the first to make such claims. See,
GREGG EASTERBROOK, MOMENT ON EARTH: THE COMING AGE OF

ENVIRONMENTAL OPTIMISM 16-18 (1996); JULIAN L. SIMON, THE ULTIMATE
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World" with over 2,900 footnotes, Lomborg made a strong
claim, and the responses have been equally strong.
The Economist, for instance, called it "one of the most
valuable books on public policy-not merely on environmental
policy-to have been written for the intelligent general reader
in the past ten years ... 'The Skeptical Environmentalist' is a
triumph."4 Not to be outdone, the British newspaper, The
Daily Telegraph, called it "probably the most important book on
the environment ever written."5 A host of other publications
and, notably, conservative groups similarly lauded the book's
merits. 6 This adulation was countered by equally zealous
condemnation. A review in the eminent scientific journal,
Nature, denounced the book as "deeply flawed" and implicitly
likened Lomborg to Holocaust deniers. 7 Under the heading,
RESOURCE 5-8 (1981)

[hereinafter THE ULTIMATE RESOURCE]; JULIAN L.
at 5-9 (1996) [hereinafter THE ULTIMATE
RESOURCE 2]; THE STATE OF HUMANITY 1-2 (Julian L. Simon ed., 1995);
Ronald Bailey, The ProgressExplosion: Permanently Escaping the Malthusian
SIMON, THE ULTIMATE RESOURCE 2,

Trap, in EARTH REPORT 2000: REVISITING THE TRUE STATE OF THE PLANET 1,

7-21 (Ronald Bailey ed., 2000).
4. Doomsday Postponed, THE ECONOMIST, Sept. 8, 2001, at 89, 89-90
(book review).
5. Matt Ridley, The Greens Have Got It Wrong, THE DAILY TELEGRAPH
(UK), http://www.telegraph.co.uk (Aug. 25, 2001) (book review).
6. For instance, the New York Times hailed The Skeptical
Environmentalist as "a substantial work of analysis" that exposes the "urban
myths" of the environmental agenda. Nicholas Wade, Bjorn Lomborg: From
an Unlikely Quarter, Eco-Optimism, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 7, 2001, at F1 (book
review). A reviewer in the Washington Post agreed, calling the work a
"massive, meticulously presented argument," "a factual encyclopedia," "a
magnificent achievement," and "the most significant work on the environment
since ... Rachel Carson's Silent Spring, in 1962." Denis Dutton, Greener
Than You Think, WASH. POST, Oct. 21, 2001, at BW1 (book review). Ronald
Bailey of the Competitive Enterprise Institute concluded that Lomborg's
"magnificent and important book... deals a major blow to [environmentalism]
by superbly documenting a response to environmental doomsaying." Ronald
Bailey, Debunking Green Myths: An Environmentalist Gets It Right, REASON,
Feb. 2002, at 58, 58 (book review). More recently, Judge Alex Kozinski
provided a particularly laudatory review in the pages of the Michigan Law
Review, calling The Skeptical Environmentalist "an indispensable resource"
that provides "a balanced, thoughtful approach to environmental problems."
Alex Kozinski, Gore Wars, 100 MICH. L. REV. 1742, 1746 (2002) (book review).
7. "The text employs the strategy of those who, for example, argue that
gay men aren't dying of AIDS, that Jews weren't singled out by the Nazis for
extermination, and so on." Stuart Pimm & Jeff Harvey, No Need to Worry
About the Future, 414 NATURE 149, 149 (2001) (book review). A commentator
in the Weekly Standard, in turn, defended Lomborg by comparing
environmentalists to followers of "fanatical Islam." James K. Glassman, Green
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"Science
defends
itself
against
The
Skeptical
Environmentalist," Scientific American devoted a special
section of eleven pages to critiques of Lomborg's treatment of
climate change, biodiversity, and other topics. 8 Equally critical
articles and reports were published around the globe (including
one by Lomborg's own former colleagues at the University of
Aarhus). 9 Such detractors argued that Lomborg's "Litany" was
an outdated list of straw men, his use of data was misleadingly
selective, his treatment of issues showed basic scientific
ignorance, and worse.' 0 The most demonstrative negative
review came in the form of a pie thrown in Lomborg's face
during a book signing event at Oxford."I
Given Lomborg's claims, it's not surprising that reactions
to his book-ranging from a threatened boycott of Cambridge
University Press 2 to the Danish government's appointment of
Lomborg to head a new national environmental institute13have been so strong. What has been surprising, though, is the
starkly bipolar nature of the reactions, for there are precious
few moderate reviews or stories to be found on The Skeptical
Environmentalist. It seems either to be described as a carefully
researched unmasking of the environmental movement's scare
14
tactics or as an unprincipled, ill-informed, tendentious book.
With Rage, WKLY. STANDARD, Feb. 25, 2002, at 14, 16.
8. See John Rennie, Misleading Math About the Earth: Science Defends
Itself Against the Skeptical Environmentalist,ScI. AM., Jan. 2002, at 61, 61.
9. A number of these critiques have been posted on the web at
http://www.anti-lomborg.com. A particularly accessible account comes from
Tom Burke. See Tom Burke, Ten Pinches of Salt: A Reply to Bjorn Lomborg,
at http://www.green-alliance.org.uk/Documents/Reports/ten%20pinches
%20of%2salt.pdf (last visited Mar. 3, 2003).
10. "As science writing goes, The Skeptical Environmentalistis C-minus
stuff, as straight-forward and lackluster as a 10th-grade term paper."
Kathryn Schulz, Let Us Not Praise Infamous Men: On Bjorn Lomborg's Hidden
Agenda, GRIST MAG., http://www.gristmagazine.com/books/schulzl2l2Ol.asp
(Dec. 12, 2001).
11. See Russ Baker, The Lomborg File: When the Press is Lured by a
Contrarian'sTale, 40 COLUM. JOURNALIsM REV. 78, 78 (2002).
12. See Andrew Goldstein, Danish Darts, TIME, Aug. 26, 2002, at A60,
A60.
13. See Kozinski, supra note 6, at 1745 n.20.
14. Compare id. at 1746 (describing Lomborg's book as "a devastating
critique of the environmental scare-mongering of the last three decades"),
Bailey, supra note 6, at 59 ("[Lomborg] shows how, time and again, ideological
environmentalists misuse, distort, and ignore the vast reams of data that
contradict their dour visions."), Dutton, supra note 6 ("Lomborg found on close
analysis that the factual foundation on which the environmental doomsayers

1102

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[Vol 87:1099

Viewed from the outside, Lomborg's book seems to have acted
as a "cutting gate"-the mechanism used by ranchers to divide
cattle into separate pens. Put simply, you either love it or you
hate it. While the remarkably binary response to The Skeptical
Environmentalist may be an extreme example, it certainly is
not an isolated one. Indeed, it says a lot about the nature of
the environmental debate at the turn of the twenty-first
century.' 5 Despite over three decades of modern environmental
laws, the proliferation of citizens groups, think tanks, and
other organizations concerned with environmental issues, and
the maturation of environmental law and policy into distinct
fields of study, one still sees basically two warring camps, both
politically and ideologically entrenched on opposite ends of the
environmental battlefield. In many respects, the Lomborg
conflict is simply the most recent example of this sort of
staunch "environmental tribalism."
We are surely not the first to notice the polarization of
environmental policy and its scorched earth consequences. For
instance, Dan Farber has described the conflict between "tree
huggers" and "bean counters" as a fundamental divide over
whether environmental law and policy should be determined by
"willingness to vote" or "willingness to pay."' 6 Bob Percival and
his casebook co-authors have framed the conflict as arising
'17
between proponents of "moral outrage" and "cool analysis.

stood was deeply flawed: exaggeration, prevarications, white lies and even
convenient typographical errors had been absorbed unchallenged into the
folklore of environmental disaster scenarios."), and Charles T. Rubin, Green
No More: The Education of an Environmentalist, WKLY. STANDARD, Dec. 24,
2001, at 33, 33 ("Lomborg skillfully uncovers the source of the bias toward bad
environmental news in the scientific community, environmental interest
groups, and the media."), with Thomas Lovejoy, Biodiversity: Dismissing
Scientific Progress, SCI. AM., Jan. 2002, at 69, 71 ("Lomborg seems quite
ignorant of how environmental science proceeds .... "), Pimm & Harvey, supra
note 7, at 149 ("Like bad term papers, Lomborg's text relies heavily on
secondary sources."), Rennie, supra note 8, at 61 (noting that "many" scientists
spoke to Scientific American and complained of Lomborg's "misrepresentation
of their fields," his "incomplete use of the data," and his "misunderstanding of
the underlying science"), and Stephen Schneider, Global Warming: Neglecting
the Complexities, SCI. AM., Jan. 2002, at 62, 62 ("Lomborg admits, 'I am not
myself an expert as regards environmental problems'-truer words are not
found in the rest of the book. .. ").
15. Many of the books cited supra note 3, for instance, triggered binary
responses similar to the recent Lomborg brouhaha.
16. DANIEL A. FARBER, ECO-PRAGMATISM 39-42 (1999).
17. ROBERT V. PERCIVAL ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION: LAW,
SCIENCE, AND POLICY 73 (3d ed. 2000).
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Rob Verchick has described the divide as one of the
"philosophies of Feathers and Gold." 18 In this issue, Chris
Schroeder distinguishes between environmental "priests" and
"prophets." 19 The downside to such fierce tribal alliances is not
simply that they make the field unpleasant for those who try to
Rather, the danger is that actual
bridge the divide.
environmental policy outcomes are often found in the
unprincipled mishmash lying on the battlefield after
adversarial combat, rather than in measures designed
specifically to be pragmatic, pluralistic responses to
environmental problems. As J.B. Ruhl, who has argued for the
creation of a "radical middle" to break this tribal deadlock,
bluntly complains, "I, for one, am not sure that the annihilation
process in environmental law will ever come to an end as long
and a vacuum in
as it is framed by two opposing philosophies
20
the middle and, frankly, I am sick of it."
Well, we are too. But we wonder whether environmental
tribalism can be replaced by a "radical middle" or "ecopragmatic" approach simply because it makes so much sense to
do so. Put another way, while the apt categories listed above of
bean counters, priests, feathers, and outrage are surely
accurate descriptions of the poles of environmental advocacy,
they don't strike us as a broader explanation for the bipolar
What interests us, therefore, is why the
dynamic.
environmental field so often seems to operate as a cutting gate,
why it creates such fertile terrain for tribal behavior, and how
Without
it can be broadened to include other voices.
understanding the factors driving the environmental cutting
gate, it is difficult to assess whether eco-pragmatic proposals
can succeed in environmental policy making simply on the
strength of their own merits.
In this regard, consider how environmental protection
differs from other strongly divisive public issues. It is, of
course, not unusual to have strong advocacy at both ends of a
contested issue. Look at the public debates over abortion, the
18. Robert R. M. Verchick, Feathers or Gold? A Civic Economics for
Environmental Law, 25 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 95, 96 (2001).
19. Christopher H. Schroeder, Prophets, Priests, and Pragmatists, 87
MINN. L. REV. 1065, 1065-77 (2003).
20. J.B. Ruhl, Working Both (Positivist)Ends Toward a New (Pragmatist)
Middle in Environmental Law, 68 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 522, 524 (2000)
[hereinafter Pragmatist Middle]; see also J.B. Ruhl, A Manifesto for the
Radical Middle, 38 IDAHO L. REV. 385, 385-86 (2002) [hereinafter Radical
Middle].
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death penalty, or gun control-such fields also seem dominated
by loud "pro" and "anti" voices. But let's look more closely at
the abortion debate, which on its face seems pretty similar. It
is certainly hard to find a more "theological" topic that pits
As a useful
differing worldviews against each other.
comparison to environmental disputes where feelings run high
(such as drilling for oil in the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge 2 1),
so far so good. Notice, however, the interesting difference that
in the abortion field, the general public is also polarized, with
feelings running strongly either that abortion is tantamount to
murder or that (up to a certain stage) it is simply a medical
treatment within the discretion of the mother.2 2 In the
environmental field, by contrast, most of the public is not
similarly polarized. In fact, polls show a consistently high level
of support for environmental protection, 23 and that is what
makes the cutting gate phenomenon in environmental law and
policy so surprising.
On the topic of abortion, the advocacy dynamic seems to
On the environment,
mirror broader public perceptions.
however, that does not seem to be the case, as political
advocacy by bean counter and tree hugger tribes alike seems
more extreme and more polarized than the public
More
constituencies these groups claim to represent.
interesting still, the groups that could claim to speak for this
great silent majority cannot seem to make it on the political
Thus, we have a growing number of leading
stage.
21. See infra text accompanying note 59.
22. See Lydia Saad, Public Opinion About Abortion-An In-Depth Review,
at http://www.gallup.com/poll/specialReports/pollSummaries/sr020l2

2.asp (last visited Mar. 3, 2003) (reporting the results of an August 2001
Gallup survey in which 46% of respondents considered themselves to be prochoice, while 46% called themselves pro-life, and reporting the results of May
2001 Gallup survey in which 42% of respondents stated that abortion is
morally acceptable, while 45% felt that it is morally wrong).
23. Chris Schroeder has gathered an extensive array of opinion poll data
supporting the assertion that "Americans from every demographic,
socioeconomic, racial, and ethnic category identify themselves as concerned
about the environment. . . ." Christopher H. Schroeder, Clear Consensus,
Ambiguous Commitment, 98 MICH. L. REV. 1876, 1876, 1896-1906 (2000). As

the title of his review indicates, however, Schroeder also notes that the
ultimate strength of public environmental commitment "is ambiguous because
Americans have not thoroughly considered how they would trade competing
values with environmental values in hard cases." Id. at 1905. In Part II infra,
we argue that such hard case decisions do not receive public attention and
deliberation largely because bean counters and tree huggers fail to frame
environmental issues in ways conducive to frank democratic discussion.
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environmental law and policy scholars calling for a pragmatic,
centrist approach. 24 We have a public that seems to widely
support just such an approach. 25 Yet environmental advocacy
seems to remain largely a tribal battleground. Why is that?
And, more germane to this Symposium, what does that mean
for the prospects of an eco-pragmatic approach successfully
passing through the cutting gate?
Our exploration of these issues proceeds in two parts. In
Part I, we describe in more detail what we mean by
environmental tribalism, focusing on reactions to The Skeptical
Environmentalist as an illustrative example. Part II then
examines the dynamics that drive the cutting gate phenomenon
and reinforce tribal behavior. We conclude by noting that the
social dynamics described in Part II tend to block both the
emergence and acceptance of eco-pragmatism at the level of
public advocacy. We argue, therefore, that scholars and others
seeking to advance the cause of the "radical middle" should
focus their efforts in those areas where environmental
tribalism is least entrenched and pragmatism most
appreciated-at the level of policy implementation.
I. TRIBALISM IN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY
What would an anthropologist make of the furor
surrounding The Skeptical Environmentalist? Our sense is
that she might describe the two groups of critics and champions
(whether labeling them as tree huggers, priests, or some other
clever moniker) as operating effectively like modern-day
tribes. 26 It seems clear that those in the environmental policy
24. See, e.g., FARBER, supra note 16, at 9; Radical Middle, supra note 20,
at 387; PragmatistMiddle, supra note 20, at 545-46. While the proposals of

Farber and Ruhl have significant differences, their main insight is similar-a
balanced environmental policy should result from considered deliberation

rather than ad hoc compromise. See also SIDNEY A. SHAPIRO & ROBERT L.
GLICKSMAN, RISK REGULATION AT RISK: RESTORING A PRAGMATIC APPROACH

(2003).
25. See infra text accompanying notes 101-03.

26. Zyg Plater made a similar observation about environmental advocacy
in a 1990 article examining the role of local groups in resource management

conflicts through case studies of the Exxon Valdez, old growth logging, and the
snail darter. See Zygmunt Plater, A Modern Political Tribalism in Natural
Resources Management, 11 PUB. LAND L. REV. 1, 6-17 (1990). He described

tribalism as "a cohesive instinctive affiliation between people based on their
recognition of and loyalty to common roots, a narrowed, non-official, racial,
social and cultural allegiance that has evolved to have remarkable staying
power and utility." Id. at 5. Correspondingly, though, he noted that tribalism
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field already think about themselves and their opponents in
tribal terms. Just look at the debate over The Skeptical
Environmentalist. In the introduction to his book, Lomborg
describes himself as an "old left-wing Greenpeace member" who
had unthinkingly bought into the "Litany. '27 While Lomborg
apparently includes this self-description to explain how he
became interested in the book project, it is fascinating that his
former association with Greenpeace has featured so
prominently in both the praise and condemnation surrounding
the book. A Lexis search turned up no less than 154 stories
from around the globe that noted Lomborg's association with
Greenpeace, including prominent mass media sources like
Time, international publications like The Australian and The
Times of London, and more obscure outlets like Fertilizer
International. Across the spectrum, commentators seemed
keenly interested in the nature of Lomborg's relationship to the
Greenpeace organization, which is, after all, one of the most
prominent clans of the tree hugger tribe. Indeed, Cambridge
University Press noted Lomborg's membership in Greenpeace
prominently in its publicity and, recognizing the value of a
turncoat, many adulatory reviews have presented his former
affiliation as proof of his credentials. The American Enterprise
Institute (AEI), a conservative think tank, went so far as to call
Lomborg "a wonderful witness for the prosecution. "28
Interestingly, Lomborg's affiliation with Greenpeace came up
in many negative reviews as well, with Lomborg attacked as
not "really" a member of Greenpeace either because he only
29
paid dues or because he was not an activist.
Why do both sides care so much about whether or not
Lomborg "really" belonged to a mass membership organization
like Greenpeace years before he wrote the book? A likely
entails exclusion and distrust of non-tribe members: "[P]eople who are not of
the tribe can be precluded from consideration, are not owed the same
deference as human beings who are members of the tribe; they are in some
sense 'alien,' and their interests are excluded from recognition in the process of
governance." Id.
27. LOMBORG, supra note 1, at xix.
28. Glassman, supra note 7, at 16.
29. See, e.g., Earthbeat, Skeptical Environmentalist Debates Critics, at
http://www.abc.net.au/rn/science/earth/stories/s394496.htm
(Oct. 13, 2001)
(quoting Tom Burke as saying that he "actually talked to Greenpeace, and

they are very clear that they have no record of Bjorn Lomborg ...as an
activist member," and that "he may have contributed money to Greenpeace...
but ... before you call yourself an environmentalist you have to do a little bit
more than contribute money").
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reason, it seems to us, is that membership in Greenpeace
serves as a badge of tribal affiliation. To defenders of Lomborg,
not only has he worn the other tribe's colors but, more
important, he now denounces their creed. They seem to be
thinking that, when it comes to matters of environmental
importance, Lomborg
should know since, after all, he was once
"one of them. '30 To critics of Lomborg, on the other hand, he
never really was part of the tribe in the first place, perhaps
writing a membership check but not adequately participating
in the requisite initiation rites. He therefore cannot speak for
the tribe because he never truly belonged. Are we taking the
tribal metaphor too far? Perhaps, but how else can one explain
the fixation on Lomborg's relationship with Greenpeace-a
matter wholly unrelated to the merits of his argument-if not
as an attempt on both sides to identify which tribe he belongs
to (and therefore can speak on behalf of)?
The tribal dynamic goes beyond mere membership in an
exclusive group. As discussed in more detail in the sections
that follow, tribal affiliation is also expressed through the
sharing of a common worldview (what in a religious context we
might call a dogma or orthodoxy). Most of Lomborg's critics, we
expect, would support the notion that the earth's environment
has a finite carrying capacity and that there are biophysical
limits to growth that in a number of cases we are approaching
or have exceeded. 31 Many of Lomborg's supporters, on the flip
side, likely view the world through the perspective of resource
economics, confident in the belief that any particular resource
constraint can be circumvented through market mechanisms
32
and that human ingenuity is the greatest resource of all.
In addition to common shared assumptions, tribal advocacy
also reveals itself through a ready acceptance of conclusions
based on perceived tribal membership of a speaker and,

30. Similar examples of misguided pasts might include, "Pacifist Joins the
Marines" or "Vegetarian Becomes Big Mac Lover."
31. See, e.g., John P. Holdren, Energy: Asking the Wrong Question, SCI.
AM., Jan. 2002, at 65, 65 ("What environmentalists mainly say on [the topic of
resource scarcity] is not that we are running out of energy, but that we are
running out of environment ...running out of the capacity of the air, water,
soil and biota to absorb, without intolerable consequences for human wellbeing, the effects of energy extraction, transport, transformation and use.").
32. See, e.g., Kozinski, supra note 6, at 1752-53 (arguing that advances in
technology, the ability to substitute resource inputs, and efficiency gains in the
use of resources mean that, in the long run, "prices for materials always
drop").
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relatedly, a strong reluctance to admit shortcomings in fellow
tribe members' work. These aspects of the environmental
movement have been pointed out in a newsletter of the AEI
that described the worldview of environmental groups as an
"uncompromising viewpoint" that "gives rise to what might be
called environmental correctness .... Disagreement with that
viewpoint is ascribed to a moral defect." 33 However accurately
this description may fit parts of the tree hugger tribe, it is
interesting to note that the AEI authors do not appear to see
the same dynamics happening among bean counters as well.
A further feature of environmental tribalism takes the
form of a strong skepticism among people who employ the
methodologies or languages of competing tribes. This is evident
in the educational training and professional affiliations of
Lomborg's supporters and critics. In looking at the background
of book review authors, with rare exceptions, Lomborg's critics
all have been scientists and professional staff members of
environmental organizations.
Their strongest consistent
criticism has been Lomborg's lack of scientific understanding,
as demonstrated by his lack of scientific credentials and the
fact that he has never published in an academic journal on
environmental issues. Lomborg supporters, on the other hand,
have largely been social scientists (primarily, economists and
political scientists), and they have praised Lomborg for his
focus on hard numbers and technical assessment of the costs
and benefits of environmental regulation. 34 It is evident from
reading even a handful of these reviews that neither group
particularly trusts the other's methodologies, assumptions, or
intentions.
While comparing environmental advocacy to a tribal
dynamic is, we believe, a useful means for describing the
seemingly unbridgeable divide across environmental policy,
there are at least three important caveats to keep in mind.
First, there is an important distinction between tribal
identification and the more common phenomenon of interest
group identification. One can point to many advocacy groups
that share a political goal but do not necessarily share tribal
characteristics. Coming together in a common political cause,
such as advocating for a higher minimum wage, frequently
33. Steven F. Hayward & Christopher DeMuth, AEI's Environmental
Policy Outlook, at http://www.aei.org/epo/epo14224.htm (July 2002).
34. Some representative sources on both sides of the Lomborg debate are
gathered supra note 14.
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occurs without producing the same social dynamics that one
observes in the environmental field. Something different seems
to be at work here. Second, we are by no means suggesting
that people in the environmental field are unthinking acolytes
who fervently bow at the altar and mouth their tribe's dogma.
Yes, Virginia, we do have free will. Those within the
environmentalist community often differ on specific issues, as
do those who fall within the bean counter tribe. Nevertheless,
despite these individual variations, social forces clearly are at
work within the field that tend to reproduce tribal behavior
time after time and, importantly, that seem also to impede the
development of more integrated, inclusive advocacy. Third,
while the tribalism phenomenon creates an impression that
environmental protection is divisive and polarized throughout
the field, a middle does exist, of course, between the two poles
of the environmental spectrum. As we discuss at the end of
this Article, 35 this is most evident at the policy implementation
level, where compromise happens quite often and might even
be described as the way of the world. Our initial focus, however,
is at the public advocacy level. It is here, we contend, that the
cutting gate continues to operate and that the level of discourse
has long remained bipolar.
II. THE CUTTING GATE
While modern environmental law may have been ushered
into existence by "an orgy of consensus," 36 its recent public
visage more closely resembles a stockyard. Just as cattle are
deftly herded into separate pens by a cutting gate, participants
in environmental law and policy debates often seem to respond
to a cutting gate of their own, a set of values, beliefs, or
characteristics that divide them neatly into pens of "bean
counters" and "tree huggers," to use Farber's evocative
distinction. Occasionally, some salient event like the release of
The Skeptical Environmentalist shines an especially bright
light on these pens, exposing both the deep divisions within the
environmental law and policy community and the mudslinging,
caterwauling, grunting, and groaning that exist between them.
What is not so clearly revealed, however, are the dynamics that
drive the cutting gate phenomenon in the first place. Only by
better understanding the forces that drive environmental
35. See infra text accompanying notes 119-23.
36. Radical Middle, supra note 20, at 388.
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advocates farther apart can one identify where eco-pragmatic
approaches will be most likely to succeed. The following
sections explore this issue by reviewing a variety of
explanations, both old and new, for the cutting gate
phenomenon (many of which were noted by Farber in his
keynote presentation to this Symposium). 37
A. ADVERSARIAL POLICY MAKING

A common explanation for the cutting gate is the fact that
environmental policy tends to be formed within highly
contested, adversarial settings.
Under such conditions,
extremism is a strategically effective form of advocacy and,
indeed, may even be necessary to end up with an acceptable
middle compromise. As John Dwyer notes, "[T]he posturing
that accompanies adversary proceedings polarizes the debate,
making accommodation less likely. Parties may take extreme
positions to satisfy constituencies or ideological commitments.
As substantive positions harden, parties may find it more
difficult to make tradeoffs. The inevitable result is more
litigation and delayed policymaking." 38 Thus, even if competing
environmental tribes agree on the state of relevant scientific
knowledge and agree on the consequences of adopting or
delaying regulation, the rule-making process still may tend to
appear dramatically polarized because neither tribe will be
willing to weaken its bargaining position by conceding ground
ab initio.39 Put simply, ugly though it may be, tribalism
40
works.

37. See Daniel A. Farber, Building Bridges Over Troubled Waters: Ecopragmatism and the Environmental Prospect, 87 MINN. L. REV. 851, 861
(2003) (describing barriers to effective environmental decision making posed
by "the limited ability of voters to process information about environmental
issues," and "distortions in public discourse and in the legislative process").
38. See John P. Dwyer, Contentiousness and Cooperation in
Environmental Regulation, 35 AM. J. COMP. L. 809, 820 (1987) (citations
omitted).
39. This strategic positioning is, of course, even more apparent in public
advocacy fora such as radio talk shows, newsmagazines, and other popular
media outlets. See infra text accompanying notes 71-77.
40. As detailed in infra text accompanying notes 119-23, concerted efforts
have been made by both academics and regulators to fashion less adversarial
approaches to environmental rule making that may reduce tribal posturing.
At present such reinvention remains fairly atypical within environmental
regulation. See Richard B. Stewart, A New Generation of Environmental
Regulation?, 29 CAP. U. L. REV. 21, 23-25 (2001). Nevertheless, Farber
believes that new models of the regulatory process will garner increasing
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B. COMPETING WORLDVIEWS
Another frequent explanation for polarity among
environmental advocates points to a stark, irreconcilable
contrast in worldviews. Farber, for instance, argues that
"[c]ontesting [d]ogmas" 4 1 lie at the heart of environmental
polarization: one in which the natural sphere is viewed as
intrinsically valuable and worthy of protection irrespective of
its instrumental significance versus another in which the
environment is seen as a material resource that should be
subjected to market dynamics like any other input to
production. The former tree hugger vision emphasizes the need
for public participation in environmental, health, and safety
decision making in order to ensure that the sacredness of life
and nature are given effect in public policy. The latter bean
counter vision argues that such decision making should be
determined primarily, if not solely, by weighing the costs and
benefits at stake, where costs and benefits are measured by
market-expressed preferences or their nearest equivalent. 4 2 As
many scholars have argued, if these competing normative
orientations accurately describe most advocates' viewpoints in
environmental policy debates, then meaningful dialogue or
43
compromise among them will be essentially precluded.
support as the necessity of workable, compromise solutions to environmental
problems becomes ever more apparent: "So long as the political equilibrium
requires accommodation between supporters and opponents of environmental
regulation, rather than allowing a clear-cut victory to one side or the other,

reinvention will be a politically attractive platform."

Daniel A. Farber,

Triangulating the Future of Reinvention: Three Emerging Models of
EnvironmentalProtection, 2000 U. ILL. L. REV. 61, 67-68.
41. FARBER, supra note 16, at 5.
42. See id. at 39 ("[Tjhe choice seems to lie between 'tree huggers,' who

hold the environment sacred and reject economic values as profane, and 'bean
counters,' who believe only in values that can be quantified in dollars and
cents.").
43. To complicate matters further, libertarianism provides an additional
competing worldview in the environmental context that plays a strong role in

land use policy, takings, and other areas related to property rights.
Specifically, opponents of environmental restrictions on property use tend to
view governmental regulation as an unjustified infringement on private
liberty.
See Farber, supra note 37, at 862 (describing the "counterreformationists who are less interested in tradeoffs between costs and benefits

than in using the Constitution to eviscerate environmental regulation"); Keith
Hirokawa, Some Pragmatic Observations About Radical Critique in
Environmental Law, 21 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 225, 233 (2002) (noting that
opposition to the Endangered Species Act "has consistently cited the

protections of property rights deeply established in constitutional, statutory
and common law"); Richard Epstein, Too Pragmatic by Half, 109 YALE L.J.
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Discussants may appear to address the same subject matter,
but they will do so by employing conceptual categorizations
that simply do not translate into each other's terms.44 As the
title of a 2002 Symposium held at the University of Florida
stated so well,
"Industry is from Mars, Environmentalists are
45
from Venus."
We have little doubt that the rhetorical surface of
environmental advocacy often reflects these competing
worldviews. 46 However accurate, though, this description does
not account for why one is guided into the tree hugger or bean
counter pen in the first place. 47 After all, bean counters do not
prefer cost-benefit analysis out of unprincipled contempt for
public judgment. Rather, they argue against purely democratic
resolution of environmental, health, and safety regulation
issues by citing problems of rent-seeking at the political level
and the public's frequent lack of adequate knowledge to make
welfare-maximizing decisions at the grassroots level. Even
when accurate scientific information is available to the public,
bean counters point out that lay judgments still often rely on
cognitive heuristics that lead to normatively undesirable
1639, 1642 (2000) (reviewing FARBER, supra note 16) (describing viewpoint of
those "who see in the self-professed environmental movement an arrogance
that results in the trampling of individual liberty"). In keeping with Farber's
typological theme, we might refer to these property rights advocates as "fence
builders."
44.

Cf. MARK SAGOFF, THE ECONOMY OF THE EARTH: PHILOSOPHY, LAW,

AND THE ENVIRONMENT

94 (1988) (arguing that analysts who rely on
willingness-to-pay measures of environmental protection commit a "category
mistake": They "askU of beliefs about objective facts a question that is
appropriate only to subjective interests and desires").
45. See Symposium, Industry is from Mars, Environmentalists are from
Venus: Reconciling our Differences on Earth, 17 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 375
(2002).
46. Witness, for instance, the strong reaction provoked by the efforts of
leading environmental scientists to provide monetary estimates of the
instrumental value of ecosystem services to humanity. See, e.g., GRETCHEN C.
DAILY & KATHERINE ELLISON, THE NEW ECONOMY OF NATURE: THE QUEST TO
MAKE CONSERVATION PROFITABLE 1-17 (2002). Rutgers University biologist
David Ehrenfeld provides a representative, if charged, example of this
reaction: "I am afraid that I don't see much hope for a civilization so stupid
that it demands a quantitative estimate of the value of its own umbilical cord."
Jeff Gersh, Bigger, Badder-But Not Better, THE AMICUS J., Jan. 1, 1999, at 32,
36.
47. We realize, of course, that dividing the environmental advocacy world
into tribes of bean counters and tree huggers is overly simplistic. While there
will surely be some counter examples to many of the generalizations we make
in this Article, we believe that the cutting gate phenomenon is real and
strongly operates in a bipolar fashion.
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results when dealing with complex risk tradeoffs.
Most
individuals, for instance, seem to respond to the mere
possibility of certain types of risk, such as the meltdown of a
nuclear reactor, rather than the probability of such an event.4 8
In that case, lay demand for safety in the nuclear industry may
be insensitive to the magnitude of risk or the diminishing
marginal utility of increased safety investment-attitudes that
strike bean counters as being inconsistent with widely accepted
notions of rationality. 49 Similarly, individuals tend to exhibit
different regulatory preferences when previously unnoticed
costs and benefits of action are forced "on-screen," yet few
aspects of the individual's everyday information
environment
50
direct attention to such "off-screen" factors.
Accordingly, bean counters believe that public demand for
environmental, health, and safety regulation may not reflect
truly informed preferences. Advocates of risk-risk analysis,
comparative risk assessment, and allied decision-making tools
aim to overcome informational and cognitive limitations of this
sort by institutionalizing
procedures for unearthing
opportunity costs, unintended consequences, and other matters
likely to fall into regulatory blind spots. As these examples
make clear, bean counters advocate technocratic approaches to
risk regulation such as cost-benefit analysis, not to supplant
public judgment, but rather to provide the public with the level
of environmental, health, and safety investment that it
hypothetically would demand given better scientific
information and a decision-making context that permits
dispassionate analysis. 51 Lomborg's tome, flawed though it

48.

See Paul Slovic et al., The Affect Heuristic, in HEURISTICS AND BIASES:

THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INTUITIVE JUDGMENT 397, 397-400 (Thomas Gilovich et
al. eds., 2002).
49. See FARBER, supra note 16, at 66 ("Surely, we don't want government

policy to be based on irrational hysteria about environmental problems.");
Cass R. Sunstein, Probability Neglect: Emotions, Worst Cases, and Law, 112

YALE L.J. 61, 106 (2002) (noting that, in general, "the government should not
respond if the public is demanding attention to a statistically miniscule risk,
and doing so simply because people are visualizing the worst that can
happen").
50. See HOWARD MARGOLIS, DEALING WITH RISK: WHY THE PUBLIC AND
THE EXPERTS DISAGREE ON ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES 121-43 (1996).

51.

See W. KIP VISCUSI, REFORMING PRODUCTS LIABILITY 63 (1991) ("If

[the] market ideal was generally applicable, there would be no need for social
risk management

agencies.").

institutions

such as

products liability

or regulatory
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may be, 52 nevertheless reflects a common belief among
observers of the risk regulation process that public
understanding of the "Real State of the World" is woefully
leads to
misinformed and that such misunderstanding
53
resources.
public
of
allocation
suboptimal
The competing tree hugger tribe also becomes significantly
more nuanced in its worldview upon close inspection. Tree
huggers, for instance, do not object to cost-benefit analysis out
of Luddite disdain for expert judgment. Rather, they argue
that the manner in which cost-benefit analysis is conducted in
practice excludes a variety of significant, morally relevant
considerations. Reducing risk to a quantitative estimate of
harm, for instance, ignores a host of ways in which qualitative
dimensions of environmental, health, or safety hazards matter
significantly to lay observers. 54 Failure to account for such
dimensions may lead experts to systematically understate the
welfare gains to be achieved from hazard avoidance. 55
Similarly, when monetizing the benefits of environmental,
52. See generally Douglas A. Kysar, Some Realism About Environmental
Skepticism, 29 ECOL. L.Q. (forthcoming 2003) (reviewing LOMBORG, supra
note 1).
53. A large and controversial literature, for instance, argues that federal
environmental, health, and safety expenditures could be reallocated to
produce a greater number of total lives saved. See, e.g., ROBERT W. HAHN ET
AL., DO FEDERAL REGULATIONS REDUCE MORTALITY? 1 (2000); Ralph Keeney,
Mortality Risks Induced by Economic Expenditures, 10 RISK ANALYSIS 147,
147 (1990); Randall Lutter & John F. Morrall III, Health-Health Analysis: A
New Way to Evaluate Health and Safety Regulation, 8 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY
43, 49 tbl.1 (1994); Tammy 0. Tengs & John D. Graham, The Opportunity
Costs of Haphazard Social Investments in Life-Saving, in RISKS, COSTS, AND
LIVES SAVED: GETTING BETTER RESULTS FROM REGULATION 167, 167 (Robert
W. Hahn ed., 1996); W. Kip Viscusi & Richard J. Zeckhauser, The Fatalityand
Injury Costs of Expenditures, 8 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 19, 19 (1994); W. Kip
Viscusi, Mortality Effects of Regulatory Costs and Policy Evaluation Criteria,
25 RAND J. ECON. 94, 94 (1994).
54. See Clayton P. Gillette & James E. Krier, Risks, Courts, and Agencies,
138 U. PA. L. REV. 1027, 1075 (1990) (reviewing evidence suggesting that
"[flor lay people, 'riskiness' means more than 'expected number of fatalities'
and that "[flor experts, it doesn't" (citation omitted)); Paul Slovic, Perceptionof
Risk, in THE PERCEPTION OF RISK 220, 231 (Paul Slovic ed., 2001) (noting that
lay individuals' "basic conceptualization of risk is much richer than that of
experts and reflects legitimate concerns that are typically omitted from expert
risk assessments").
55. See Gillette & Krier, supra note 54, at 1075 ("[E]xpert assessments of
the high-technology hazards so prominent in the public risk debate will
commonly be understated when viewed from the popular perspective, because
lay assessments work up from the point at which experts tend to stopexpected mortality and morbidity." (footnote omitted)).
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health, and safety regulation, practitioners of cost-benefit
analysis tend to rely on market-derived data that are intended
to capture the public's "revealed preference" for preserving
human life or natural goods.
Tree huggers object that
individuals do not ordinarily conceive of such items in
commodity terms and therefore may not provide particularly
meaningful valuations for policy analysis through their market
behavior. Finally, the bean counters' practice of discounting
the future benefits of regulation to a present value also suffers
from a conceptual problem in the view of tree huggers. Many
aspects of environmental decision making entail judgments
regarding the distribution of natural resources between
generations-judgments that arguably should precede the use
of a discount rate, not be determined by it.5 6 Thus, tree
huggers favor public resolution of risk regulation issues, not to
ignore scientific and technical methodologies, but to provide an
outlet for expression of values that they do not believe can be
subsumed within such methodologies.
In short, although many commentators argue that bean
counters and tree huggers share only "a belief that
environmental policy can be based on a single overriding value,
whether that value is economic or environmental," 57 such
extremism characterizes the rhetoric more than the reality of
their viewpoints. Like the public at large, bean counters and
tree huggers instead seem to recognize the existence of
competing economic and environmental considerations. In
practical terms, their differences ultimately reduce to
contrasting beliefs over the proper manner to weigh and
compare such values, not a dispute concerning their existence
or their political validity.
Bean counters tend to favor
technocratic resolution of risk regulation issues because they
believe that "willingness to.vote" carries with it informational

56. See Daniel A. Farber & Paul A. Hemmersbaugh, The Shadow of the
Future:Discount Rates, Later Generations,and the Environment, 46 VAND. L.
REV. 267, 289-93 (1993); Lisa Heinzerling, Discounting Life, 108 YALE L.J.
1911, 1915 (1999); Lisa Heinzerling, Discounting Our Future, 34 LAND &
WATER L. REV. 39, 40-41 (1999); Lisa Heinzerling, Environmental Law and
the Present Future, 87 GEO. L.J. 2025, 2069 (1999); Richard B. Norgaard &
Richard B. Howarth, Sustainability and Discounting the Future, in
ECOLOGICAL
ECONOMICS:
THE
SUSTAINABILITY 88, 97-98 (Robert

SCIENCE

AND

MANAGEMENT

OF

Costanza ed., 1991); Richard L. Revesz,
Environmental Regulation, Cost-Benefit Analysis, and the Discounting of
Human Lives, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 941, 947-48 (1999).
57.

See FARBER, supra note 16, at 9.
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and cognitive deficiencies that result in suboptimal allocation of
society's limited resources.
Tree huggers tend to favor
democratic resolution of the same issues because they believe
"willingness to pay" imperfectly captures the value that society
derives from investing in the environment. Both tribes seem to
agree, though, that the regulatory goal consists in maximizing
the benefit-broadly construed-that society derives from its
natural capital. 58 This account, then, tells a more hopeful story
than the standard competing worldviews account of
environmental polarization, where bean counters and tree
huggers speak past each other, their arguments passing like
ships in the night. Perhaps, instead, the divide is less
theological than commonly assumed, with space for common
pragmatic agreement. As the next section describes, however,
strong social and cognitive dynamics frustrate environmental
consensus building.
58. See Schroeder, supra note 19, at 1070 (noting that the instrumentalist
"vernacular of the priesthood has gained an upper hand as the language used
in the policy debates"); A. Dan Tarlock, Slouching Toward Eden: The Ecopragmatic Challenges of Ecosystem Revival, 87 MINN. L. REV. 1173, 1178
(2003) (noting that the anthropocentric view of environmental law generally
has prevailed and that "[elnvironmentalism has become a more rational
movement, dominated by economics and ecology," rather than morality and
spirituality). There are important exceptions, of course. The Endangered
Species Act, for instance, is often justified by the moral maxim that human
activity should not cause the complete erasure of nonhuman life. See Tenn.
Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 173-88 (1978) (reviewing the history and
purpose of the Endangered Species Act). Conversely, opposition to the
Endangered Species Act, wetlands regulation, and other environmentally
justified impositions on land use typically invokes the language of individual
rights, rather than that of consequentialist reasoning. See supra note 43.
Increasingly, though, even these debates are adopting an instrumentalist
vernacular. Recent defenses of species preservation, for instance, have focused
on the potential significance of biodiversity as an indicator of or even
determining factor of ecosystem service provision: "Although the relationship
between biodiversity and ecosystem processes is complex, researchers are
repeatedly finding that diversity of species assemblages is tied directly to
ecosystem productivity, resilience, and sustainability." PragmatistMiddle,
supra note 20, at 542-43. Similarly, the property rights movement seems to
have become attracted to the ideas provided by free market environmentalism,
in which property rights are seen as desirable not merely as means of
effectuating individual liberty, but also as instruments for grappling with
certain forms of environmental externalities. See, e.g., James L. Huffman,
Judge Plager's"Sea Change" in Regulatory Takings Law, 6 FORDHAM ENVTL.
L.J. 597, 598 n.l (1995) ("Advocates of free market environmentalism take
the position that property rights protection is critical to wise resource
management and that many, if not most, environmental objectives will be
better achieved through a clearly defined system of property rights and free
markets.").
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C. THE ROLE OF KNOWLEDGE
Different worldviews suggest not only a values divide but,
equally important, different perceptions of relevant knowledge
regarding human development, environmental impact, and the
demand for environmental, health, and safety regulation. As a
result, environmental advocacy rarely focuses solely, or even
primarily, on ethics. Instead, given the inevitable uncertainty
surrounding environmental policy decisions, advocacy debates
typically consist of competing accounts of the likelihood and
severity of a threatened environmental harm or the cost and
effectiveness of a proposed regulatory initiative. Just look at
the debate over oil drilling in the Arctic National Wildlife
Refuge. To be sure, opponents imply that drilling is unethical
by calling the Refuge a "pristine wilderness" and "America's
Serengeti," but such appeals represent only a small part of the
public debate. The key points of contention are empiricalwhat is the likely impact of drilling on local flora and fauna,
how much oil will be recovered, and what are the economic
59
benefits to the region?
It is no coincidence, moreover, that the annual publications
of environmental organizations typically bear authoritative
sounding titles such as the "State of the World" or "Vital
Signs." 60 Nor is it a coincidence that Lomborg subtitled his

59. See Sheila Weigert, Note, Arctic National Wildlife Refuge: In the
Debate Over Drilling in the Refuge's Coastal Plain, The Environment Is the
Only True Loser, 8 ENVTL. LAW. 169, 170-74 (2001) (reviewing a variety of
arguments offered for and against drilling in the Arctic National Wildlife
Refuge, all of which focus on ecological and economic impacts).
60. Each year, the Worldwatch Institute, an environmental think tank,
publishes two factual compendiums entitled "State of the World" and "Vital
Signs: The Trends that Are Shaping Our Future." See, e.g., WORLDWATCH
INST., STATE OF THE WORLD 2002 (2002); WORLDWATCH INST., VITAL SIGNS
2002: THE TRENDS THAT ARE SHAPING OUR FUTURE (2002). The Competitive
Enterprise Institute similarly has published volumes entitled "The True State
of the Planet" and "Earth Report 2000: Revisiting the True State of the
Planet."
See, e.g., COMPETITIVE ENTER. INST., EARTH REPORT 2000:
REVISITING THE TRUE STATE OF THE PLANET (Ronald Bailey ed., 2000);

COMPETITIVE ENTER. INST., THE TRUE STATE OF THE PLANET: TEN OF THE
WORLD'S PREMIER ENVIRONMENTAL RESEARCHERS IN A MAJOR CHALLENGE TO

THE ENVIRONMENTAL MOVEMENT (Ronald Bailey ed., 1995). The World
Resources Institute maintains a continuously updated compendium of global
environmental, social, and economic data on its website "Earth Trends: The
Environmental Information Portal." See World Res. Inst., Earth Trends: The
Environmental Information Portal, at http://www.earthtrends.wri.org (last
visited Mar. 3, 2003).
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manuscript, "Measuring the Real State of the World." 6 1 Tree
huggers and bean counters alike are attempting to position
their interpretations of the environmental condition as
objective, fact driven, and scientifically grounded. Indeed, it is
precisely Lomborg's claim to have captured the import of
scientific and economic data free from bias that has incited his
62
critics and emboldened his champions.
This strong emphasis on factual disputes raises the
possibility that tribalism is not a permanent or unavoidable
feature of environmental policy making. Unlike other policy
debates that also seem to reflect fundamentally incompatible
worldviews-such as debates over abortion or the death
penalty-the environmental debate generally takes place in the
context of questions requiring empirical investigation. Thus
environmental advocates tend to focus their efforts on
convincing the public that their empirical account is the most
accurate one. In this regard, the environmental debate seems
unique. We have little reason, for instance, to think that
complete factual agreement on the deterrent effect of capital
punishment or the physiological stages of pregnancy would
eliminate polarization in the death penalty and abortion
debates. By contrast, if both bean counter and tree hugger
tribes could agree on the substance of and confidence limits
surrounding relevant physical and social scientific knowledge,
then in theory a significant amount of disagreement over the
necessity and desirability of environmental regulation would
disappear. Indeed some observers of environmental law are
optimistic that the era of polarization eventually will greatly
diminish, if not come to an end. Dan Esty, for instance, argues
that
[bly reducing the scope of what is 'art' (as opposed to science) in
environmental debates, we will be able to narrow the range over
which political judgment must be exercised. In doing so, we will
reduce the depth of the current political divide that makes today's
environmental politics so polarized.63

We share the hope that advances in knowledge will help
catalyze meaningful dialogue among participants in policy61. See LOMBORG, supra note 1.
62. In this regard, witness the remarkable frequency with which
Lomborg's positive reviewers mention the number of footnotes contained in
The Skeptical Environmentalist, as if prolific footnoting were a reliable
indicator of scientific veracity. See Kysar, supra note 52 (manuscript at 3).
63. Daniel C. Esty, Next Generation Environmental Law: A Response to
RichardStewart, 29 CAP. U. L. REV. 183, 200 (2001) (footnote omitted).
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making debates. Notably, recent examples of environmental
success stories such as the Montreal Protocol's CFC phase-out
seem driven in large part by the international environmental
policy-making community's widespread agreement on the
underlying scientific facts. 64 The Intergovernmental Panel on
Climate Change (IPCC) provides a similar case in progress,
with (almost all) national governments stating that their policy
positions will be driven in part by the findings of this
international body of scientists. 65 Conceivably, if similar
consensus were achieved on the scope and content of knowledge
regarding other environmental issues, then the calculus of
environmental, health, and safety decision making would
become considerably less polarized and more tractable.
As the following sections explain, however, there are
reasons to remain circumspect about the possibility of fact
driven consensus in environmental law and policy. Specifically,
a number of social dynamics inherent in environmental
advocacy seem likely to impede the emergence of an effective,

64. At some point, in other words, the relevant producers of CFCs could
no longer plausibly contest the relationship between the gases and ozone
depletion. See MICHAEL E. KRAFT, ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY & POLITICS 20
(2001) (citing the Montreal Protocol as an example of how "[c]onsensus among
scientists can speed agreement on how to respond to hazards"); see also id. at
33 (noting that the CFC phaseout "is often cited as a model of global
environmental governance").
65. Even the Bush administration no longer disputes the existence, of
human influence on climate change. In 2002, the Environmental Protection
Agency issued a report focusing on the threatened impact of climate change to
the United States that was very much in line with IPCC scientific predictions.
See ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, U.S. CLIMATE ACTION REPORT-2002 (2002). To
be sure, President Bush appeared not to embrace the document with zeal:
when asked by a reporter to comment on the study, he replied simply, "I read
the report put out by the bureaucracy."
George Archibald & Carter
Dougherty, Bush Pans Kyoto as Japan OKs Pact; EPA Diverges From
President's Views, WASH. TIMES, June 5, 2002, at Al. As a general matter,
though, the Bush administration shifted its opposition to the Kyoto Protocol
from scientific to economic grounds-that is, from being scientifically
unfounded to being excessively costly. See id. (quoting President Bush as
saying that "[tihe Kyoto treaty would severely damage the United States
economy," and that he "[doesn't] accept that"). As further demonstration of a
growing scientific consensus, consider the fact that several major oil
companies have now acknowledged the relationship between carbon emissions
and climate change (although their concessions come on the heels of a
protracted information campaign to the contrary, see infra text accompanying
notes 80-83). See Richard L. Ottinger & Mindy Jayne, Global Climate Change
Kyoto Protocol Implementation: Legal Frameworks for Implementing Clean
Energy Solutions, 18 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 19, 70 (2000) (describing
movements of oil companies to acknowledge climate change).
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eco-pragmatic constituency on the public stage, regardless of
the degree of factual consensus that develops among scientific
experts on environmental issues. Tribal rivalry has proven
resilient even as our knowledge base becomes ever more
complete.
1. Group Polarization
As much as knowledge plays a basic role in environmental
policy decisions, so too, does uncertainty over knowledge. The
debate over climate change, for instance, is plagued by
scientific uncertainty over its likely physical and biological
impacts as well as economic uncertainty over the costs of such
impacts and various proposed mitigation strategies. Because
even those environmental issues where knowledge is well
developed remain complex, a great deal of interpretive
discretion inheres in the comprehension and communication of
scientific and economic knowledge regarding environmental
issues.
Moreover, the combination of uncertainty and
complexity creates an atmosphere conducive to group
polarization-the tendency for individuals to become more
extreme in their views by virtue of their membership in a
group. 66 Thus, rather than being brought closer together by the
development of scientific knowledge, environmental groups
may in fact become more polarized as the mounting record of
evidence gets interpreted in vastly different ways by opposing
tribes. This certainly seems to have been the case in the debate
over The Skeptical Environmentalist.
Cass Sunstein recently provided an overview of social
science research exploring such dynamics. 67 As he notes,
groups tend to become more polarized as they deliberate due to
two principal mechanisms. First, and most intuitively, groups
face an "argument pool" problem in that their background
beliefs may lead them to selectively seek out, offer, and
consider evidence and arguments that are skewed to support
their pre-deliberative tendencies (i.e., to believe that the state
of the environment is either degrading or improving). If, in the
extreme, environmental doomsayers only read and discuss
reports published by Greenpeace, and if environmental
naysayers only read and discuss the optimistic accounts of

66. See Cass R. Sunstein, Deliberative Trouble? Why Groups Go to
Extremes, 110 YALE L.J. 71, 74 (2000).
67. See id. at 77-96.
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authors such as Lomborg, then both groups are likely to become
68
more entrenched in their views by virtue of group affiliation.
In fact, it is more subtle than this, since both groups can read a
careful report with ranges of impacts, such as those from the
IPCC, and then consciously or unconsciously select only the low
or high ends of the range with little or no attention to relevant
69
measures of likelihood.
Second, members of groups tend to become more extreme
in their pre-deliberative views because of social influences on
self-perception. 70 Put simply, if one person's sense of self
includes a belief that she is "greener" than the average
individual, then her beliefs and choices are dependent to some
extent on her concept of the average individual.
Thus,
associating primarily or exclusively with like-minded
individuals may prompt her to become more extreme in her
environmental views simply in order to maintain her self-image
as being "greener" than average.
A third contributor to group polarization comes from the
activity of individuals and entities that seek for one reason or
another to raise the salience of certain ideas or beliefs in public
discourse. Such "availability entrepreneurs 7 1 play upon the
well-documented cognitive tendency of individuals to confuse
salience with prevalence, or vividness with commonness. 72 By

68. In the extreme case, a tribe becomes so segregated and biased in its
deliberative tendencies that it ceases to command any respect whatsoever
outside the narrow confines of its membership. The attempt to equate
Lomborg and his champions with Holocaust deniers appears to have been
intended to attach such a stigma to environmental naysayers. See supra text

accompanying note 7.
69. Stephen Schneider, for example, argues that Lomborg's approach to
global climate change in The Skeptical Environmentalist consisted of simply

selecting from Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change reports the least
threatening

of every range of climate

change impacts

and the

most

threatening of every range of mitigation costs. See Schneider, supra note 14,
at 62-64.
70. See Sunstein, supra note 66, at 88-89.
71. See Timur Kuran & Cass R. Sunstein, Availability Cascades and Risk

Regulation, 51 STAN. L. REV. 683, 683 (1999). In related work, Sunstein also
has referred to "polarization entrepreneurs," see Sunstein, supra note 66, at
97, "norm entrepreneurs," see Cass R. Sunstein, Social Norms and Social
Roles, 96 CoLUM. L. REV. 903, 909 (1996), and "terrorist entrepreneurs," see
Cass R. Sunstein, Why They Hate Us: The Role of Social Dynamics, 25 HARV.
J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 429, 430 (2002).
72. See Jon D. Hanson & Douglas A. Kysar, Taking Behavioralism
Seriously: The Problem of Market Manipulation,74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 630, 662-64

(1999) (reviewing psychological literature on the availability heuristic).
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highlighting certain dramatic facts, stories, or scenarios,
availability entrepreneurs seek to instigate self-reinforcing
mechanisms "through which expressed perceptions trigger
chains of individual responses that make these perceptions
appear increasingly plausible through their rising availability
in public discourse."73 In this manner, "mass delusions" may be
created that "produce wasteful or even detrimental laws and
74
policies."
A similar, though less sophisticated, story has long been
told
by bean
counters
in environmental
debates.
Environmental groups, citizen groups, public health advocates,
and other public interest entities have been derided for
triggering heightened national concern about the use of certain
substances such as chemical pesticides, toxic waste, and
uranium-substances that expert risk assessments conclude
are less worthy of attention than many less prominent
environmental, health, and safety concerns. 75 Often, critics
point to particularly prominent historical events that seem in
retrospect to have enflamed such "mass delusions." The Alar,
Love Canal, and Three Mile Island controversies frequently are
cited by bean counters as examples of the public's tendency
both to overreact to hazards and to demand inappropriate
legislative or regulatory responses. 76
In light of these
seemingly alarmist episodes, bean counters argue that
environmental regulators should be insulated from populist
demands for government action and that risk regulation
po'licies should be shielded from the effects of the "junk science"
77
that gives rise to such demands.

73. Kuran & Sunstein, supra note 71, at 685.
74. Id.
75. A famous report of perceptions of seriousness of environmental
problems found little agreement among public observers and Environmental

Protection Agency experts as to the nation's top risk priorities. See Leslie
Roberts, Counting on Science at EPA, 249 SCIENCE, 616, 616 (1990). As noted

in the text, such disjunctions often are attributed to the advocacy of
environmentalists. See, e.g., Kozinski, supra note 6, at 1750 (claiming that
"our perceptions are shaped by media reports that uncritically adopt and

amplify the predictions of doom peddled by professional environmentalists");
Sunstein, supra note 66, at 98 ("[T]he environmental area is filled with leaders
who took advantage of cascade-like processes and group polarization.").

76. See Kuran & Sunstein, supra note 71, at 691-701 (citing the Love
Canal and Alar episodes as examples of mass scares).
77. For instance, Kuran and Sunstein argue that risk regulation policies
should be reformed to help protect government decision makers from the
arbitrary public demand that grows out of availability cascades and the efforts
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Two points are worth noting. First, it is not always, nor
perhaps even often, the case that lay-expert divergence in risk
attitudes can be attributed to scientific naivet6 on the part of
the public. 78 Second, and more important, the "mass delusions"
account only attends to half of the contest to manage public
While certainly not denying the polarizing
perceptions.
influence of socially motivated environmental activists, it is
important to recognize that other actors who are often found in
the bean counter camp (such as industry trade organizations,
chambers of commerce, conservative think tanks, business
lobbying groups, and other economically-motivated entities)
also can manipulate public perception in a manner likely to
generate informational biases. 79 Consider, for instance, the
of availability entrepreneurs. See id. at 746-59. That is, instead of heeding
"regulatory demands rooted in availability cascades based on false
information," policy makers should provide "a measure of deference to the
purely factual judgments of scientific experts." Id. at 737 (footnote omitted).
78. As noted supra text accompanying notes 54-56, some portion of the
divergence between lay and expert risk evaluations can often be attributed to
the public's "thicker" or "richer" conceptions of risk which include qualitative
nuances that may be ignored or underweighted by expert assessments.
Additionally, apparent public overestimation of an ecological or human health
threat may turn out to be scientifically justified in the long run. Public
concern over suspected endocrine disruptors, for instance, is sometimes
described as lacking scientific support. See LOMBORG, supra note 1, at 244
(surveying the debate over hormonal activity of synthetic chemicals and
concluding that "[olur latest chemical fear of pesticides seems surprisingly
unfounded"). Yet the only point of agreement among experts regarding the
issue seems to be that further research is both needed and warranted. See
ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, ENDOCRINE DISRUPTOR SCREENING PROGRAM: REPORT

TO CONGRESS 4 (2000). Thus, dismissing public fears sometimes may overlook
the fact that scientific understanding almost unavoidably appears ill-formed
during the early stages of investigating a potential hazard.
79. Cf. Lisa Heinzerling, Pragmatistsand Environmentalists, 113 HARV.
L. REV. 1421, 1439-42 (2000) (reviewing FARBER, supra note 16) (describing
the role of industry funded studies in controversy surrounding risks of dioxin).
Indeed, given their relative ease of access to media outlets through advertising
relationships, their extensive political influence through disproportionate
lobbying efforts and campaign contributions, and their greater ability to
organize into concentrated, cohesive, and well funded factions during public
debate, these actors may be more likely to cause availability cascades than the
social activists that lie at the heart of the bean counters' concern. This
contention can be supported by analogy from principles of interest group
analysis. Public choice theory, which holds that "among the most important
sources of real world political failure is the undue influence of well organized
private groups as against diffuse, poorly organized majorities," Cass R.
Sunstein, Sexual Orientationand the Constitution:A Note on the Relationship
Between Due Process and Equal Protection,55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1161, 1177 n.79
(1988), would seem to apply with equal force to the entrepreneurial solicitation
of socially harmful availability cascades. Cf. Farber, supra note 37, at 863
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efforts of fossil fuel and manufacturing industry groups to
manipulate public perception of the global climate change
problem.
Business-funded nongovernmental organizations
began to take an active role in global climate change discussion
following international recognition of the seriousness of the
problem at the 1992 United Nations Conference on
Environment and Development in Rio de Janeiro. 80 Their
strategy during the ensuing negotiations has been to fund
availability campaigns that create two impressions in the mind
of the public: first, that scientists are roughly evenly divided
over whether greenhouse gas emissions cause global climate
change; 8' and, second, that economists are unanimous in
thinking that global climate change mitigation measures will
Both of these contentions are
lead to fiscal disaster. 82
misleading, yet the twin sound bites of industry's massive and
A
("[I]ndustry trade groups are easier to organize than the public at large ....
corollary is that special interests are likely to have a large impact on our
ability to enact environmental legislation." (footnote omitted)).
80. Indeed, at more recent international climate change conferences,
business-supported nongovernmental organizations have greatly outnumbered
their environmentalist counterparts. Chiara Giorgetti, From Rio to Kyoto: A
Study of the Involvement of Non-Governmental Organizations in the
Negotiationson Climate Change, 7 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 201, 220 (1999).
81. Hence, the Global Climate Information Project describes global
warming as a "naturally occurring phenomenon," and states that projected
increases in global temperatures are "'likely to decline' as our [scientific]
understanding of weather patterns increases." Gwynne W. Guzzeau, Indoor
Air Pollution: Energy Problems in China's Residential Sector, 11 GEO. INT'L
ENVTL. L. REV. 439, 443 n.41 (1999) (quoting GLOBAL CLIMATE INFORMATION
PROJECT, CLEARING THE AIR ABOUT THE GREENHOUSE EFFECT (1997) (on file
with Guzzeau)). The Global Climate Coalition likewise "emphasizes the split
in the scientific community regarding the 'rate and magnitude' of increased
global warming." Id. (quoting GLOBAL CLIMATE INFORMATION PROJECT,
supra).
82. The Global Climate Coalition, for instance, has funded advertising
blitzes that report losses of millions of U.S. jobs and increased prices for such
necessities as food and transportation, should the country comply with the
Kyoto emissions reduction goals. See Deborah E. Cooper, The Kyoto Protocol
and China: Global Warming's Sleeping Giant, 11 GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L. REV.
Meanwhile, the American Petroleum Institute has
401, 428 (1999).
commissioned economic studies concluding that "emissions reductions amount
to unilateral economic disarmament." Id. Such studies receive little serious
Indeed, over 2500 leading economists took the
attention from scholars.
unprecedented step of publishing "The Economists' Statement on Climate
Change" which challenged industry claims of financial disaster and asserted
instead that emissions reduction policies could be enacted without negative,
and perhaps even with positive, consequences for the world's economies. See
Douglas A. Kysar, Sustainability, Distribution, and the Macroeconomic
Analysis of Law, 43 B.C. L. REV. 1, 39 (2001).
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costly availability campaign appear to have achieved public
acceptance: Eighty-four percent of respondents in a recent
survey agreed with the statement, "[S]cientists need to do
additional research on global warming ... before we limit
ourselves to what we can or cannot do as an industrialized
83
nation."
Thus, economically motivated actors may have a degree of
influence over the creation and management of availability
cascades that is similar to environmentally motivated actors.
This observation is significant because it helps to explain the
binary nature of the cutting gate phenomenon in
environmental policy making.
We do not doubt that
environmental advocacy often is pursued through misleading
availability campaigns, but we do doubt that the battle
unequivocally or uniformly favors Greenpeace. Unfortunately,
the nature of scientific information virtually ensures its
manipulability in multiple directions. Even where scientific
understanding is relatively well developed, risks tend to be
stated in ranges, predictions presented with confidence levels,
and causal connections drawn with only tentative strokes.
Thus, the availability entrepreneur retains ample scope to
present scientific claims in a distorted fashion irrespective of
whether the scientific community is in agreement regarding the
landscape of permissible interpretations. 84 Importantly, the
availability entrepreneur also benefits from a naturally
compliant audience: cognitive and social psychology abound
with evidence that individuals tend to interpret data,
arguments, and perceptions in a manner that reinforces their
prior beliefs. 85 Thus, individuals who think the world is getting
better will tend to accept Lomborg's presentation of scientific
data, while those who believe the environment is deteriorating
will accept the Worldwatch Institute's account. In the process,
tribal boundaries will remain strong even as scientific
knowledge accumulates.

83.

Karlyn Bowman, Revisiting Attitudes About Global Warming As

Summer Heats Up, ROLL CALL, July 1, 1999, available at 1999 WL 14665886;

see also id. (describing Gallup opinion poll results in which "[o]nly 34 percent
[of respondents] were worried a great deal about global warming").
84. Cf. supra note 69 (describing Lomborg's selective presentation of data

from Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change reports).
85.

See generally ZIVA KUNDA, SOCIAL COGNITION: MAKING SENSE OF

PEOPLE 211-64 (1999) (discussing factors, such as goals and moods, that affect
judgment).
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2. Whose Knowledge?
It also bears noting that environmental policy making
must by definition depend on interdisciplinary research in
order to make considered judgments regarding the necessity
and impact of government regulation. Unfortunately, there is
often sharp disagreement among bean counters and tree
huggers regarding the proper source of authority for
information about environmental threats and the societal
impacts of regulatory interventions.8 6 Notable in this regard is
the fact that The Skeptical Environmentalist and similar
pronouncements of environmental optimism generally come
from authors who are not physical scientists, but rather
economists, 87 statisticians,8 8 journalists, 89 and other authors
without formal scientific training. Indeed, critics of The
Skeptical Environmentalist were quick to point out that the
book was produced and edited by the political sciences division
of Cambridge University Press, not its natural sciences
division. 90 Similarly, they note that several prominent reviews
of The Skeptical Environmentalist were written by authors
who, at first glance, would seem to have little if any expertise
to evaluate the strength of Lomborg's scientific claims. The
Washington Post, for instance, solicited its review from a New
Zealand philosophy professor who was identified, apparently
with no trace of irony, as someone "who lectures on the dangers
of pseudoscience." 9 1 The Michigan Law Review, in its annual
86. Economist Richard Norgaard observed the following in a review of The
Skeptical Environmentalist:
Lomborg and Cambridge University Press have made a great
contribution, but not because Lomborg's critique is constructive, for I
find it so far off-base as to be quite silly .... Rather, this episode in
science shows us the extent to which portions of academe operate on
fantastical assumptions and, based on those fantasies, critique whole
fields of science beyond their expertise ....

If academics cannot do

better at sharing an understanding of reality, why should we expect
more of society at large and the politicians we elect?
Richard B. Norgaard, Optimists, Pessimists, and Science, BIOSCIENCE, Jan.
2002, at 287, 292 (book review).
87. See, e.g., THE ULTIMATE RESOURCE, supra note 3; THE ULTIMATE
RESOURCE 2, supra note 3.
88. See, e.g., LOMBORG, supra note 1.
89. See, e.g., RONALD BAILEY, ECOSCAM: THE FALSE PROPHETS OF
ECOLOGICAL APOCALYPSE (1994).
90. See Stephen H. Schneider, Hostile Climate: On Bjorn Lomborg and
Climate Change, GRIST MAG., http://www.gristmagazine.comLbooks/Schneider
121201.asp (Dec. 12, 2001).

91. See Dutton, supra note 6.
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book review issue, offered an evaluation of Lomborg's
92
compendium of scientific information by Judge Alex Kozinski.
Perhaps not surprisingly, Judge Kozinski was unable to muster
a single critical comment about the book. 93 Indeed, he
appeared to accept Lomborg's interpretation of scientific data
primarily on the strength of the fact that Lomborg was not a
94
scientist.
Such dismissal of scientists' opinions has become
increasingly common and suggests that tribal dynamics are at
work here. Conservation biologists, atmospheric scientists,
geologists, toxicologists, and other physical scientists seem to
have been lumped into the tree hugger tribe and ascribed
impure motives.
Lomborg, for instance, questions the
traditional authority of scientists by arguing that they, too,
have financial incentives to distort knowledge about
environmental problems: "There are many grants at stake," he
writes. 95 More bluntly, Todd Zywicki contends that "the
striking tendency of environmental interest groups to
dramatically
and
consistently
misrepresent
scientific
information and economic evidence so as to mislead and 'scare'
the public," arises from the fact that, "like any other rentseeking group, the behavior of environmental interest groups
can be best explained by the desire to use the coercive power of
the state to allow some individuals to pursue utility and wealth
96
and to force other individuals to subsidize these preferences."
Accepting such a viewpoint leads to cynicism about all
scientific communications, opening the way for federal judges
without relevant academic or professional training to make
pithy pronouncements about complex scientific subjects, as if
their opinion was no different in kind from that of the
92.

Kozinski, supra note 6, at 1742.

93. See id. at 1763 (describing Lomborg's book as "based on facts and
figures that no one seriously disputes").
94. See id. at 1750 (emphasizing that Lomborg approaches his sources

with "a statistician's eye" which leads him to "very different conclusions" than
orthodox interpretations of scientific information).
95. LOMBORG, supra note 1, at 254.
96. See TODD J. ZYWICKI, BAPTISTS? THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF
POLITICAL ENVIRONMENTAL INTEREST GROUPS 2 (George Mason University
Law and
Economics
Working
Paper
Series
No.
02-23,
2002),

http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id=334341 (last visited Mar.
2, 2003). Like Kozinski, Zywicki relies on The Skeptical Environmentalist as
support for the claim that "environmental interest groups have proven
themselves dramatically wrong on almost every environmental and economic
trend since their inception in the 1970s." Id. at 8.
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thousands of scientists who jointly form the IPCC. 97 For better
or worse, the conclusions of scientists have increasingly joined
the marketplace of ideas, are treated as commodities just like
any other expression of self-interested political opinion, and are
subject to acceptance or rejection based on little more than
perceived tribal affiliation. 98 As a result, the prospects for
science-driven consensus on environmental policy-making
issues grow dim.
3. The Hidden Debate
A final reason that consensus regarding scientific
knowledge may have little effect on tribalism is that disputes
over empirical knowledge can serve as proxies for more
fundamental disputes over values. Unlike other divisive policy
issues such as abortion, environmental law and policy will
never just be driven by values or morals. Environmental
discussions necessarily concern questions about the extent of a
harm, its likely consequences, and the costs of avoidance; thus
the discussion generally does (indeed must) take place in
For reasons related to the
primarily empirical terms.
competing worldviews account of Section II.B., however,
environmental policies will never just be driven by the facts,
either. As Donald Braman and Dan Kahan have noted, when
active participants in environmental debates discuss scientific
and economic issues, they are not only "arguing about what
empirical data to trust; they are [also] attempting to push
certain risks to the center of the perceptual stage and to banish
97. Judge Kozinski's biography states that he received a Bachelor of Arts
degree prior to his legal training and does not mention any work experience in
the sciences. See Fed. Judicial Ctr., Judges of the United States Courts, at
http://air. c.gov/newweb/jnetweb.nsf/ic -bio (last visited Mar. 2, 2003).
98. Judge Kozinski, for instance, seems to have taken special comfort in
the fact that Ronald Bailey of the Competitive Enterprise Institute offered a
positive review of The Skeptical Environmentalist,see Kozinski, supra note 6,

at 1762 n.71, while Paul Ehrlich of Stanford University's biology department
offered a negative review, see id. at 1759 n.57. With tribal alliances in place,

Judge Kozinski merely had to choose his side, which he seems to have done by
dismissing Ehrlich as "the Jar Jar Binks of the environmentalist movement."
Similar tribal allegiance can be seen in Judge Kozinski's simultaneous
Id.
complaint that the predictive models of environmental scientists "often reflect,

not reality, but the pre-conceptions of the model's creators," id. at 1743, and
his failure to consider how the same criticism applies to the models of bean
counters which, after all, attempt to predict both ecological and economic
consequences of global climate change and mitigation strategies. See id. at
1756 (endorsing without qualification Lomborg's discussion of the costs and
benefits of the Kyoto Protocol).
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others to the wings because risk regulation is pregnant with
visions of the good society."99
Proponents of eco-pragmatism are well aware that
environmental policy is unavoidably value-laden in this
manner. Indeed, a chief aim of eco-pragmatism is "to keep us
firmly aware of the complexity of our values, but prevent that
complexity from entangling us to the point of inaction." 10 0 At
times, both bean counters and tree huggers create the
impression of a purely scientific divide-a policy-making space
that is polarized only by competing scientific descriptions, and
not also by competing values. The public is left sensing that it
must choose whom to believe, rather than judge how to proceed,
and these are fundamentally different decisions. The problem
with this approach to environmental advocacy is that the value
divide remains operative, however careful advocates are to
describe their positions in purely consequentialist terms,
whether scientific or economic. Thus, consensus on factual
issues in environmental law and policy may be impeded not
only by the uncertainty and manipulability of science, but also
because reaching full agreement on factual issues may require
full agreement on the deeper, submerged moral and cultural
divides as well.
CONCLUSION
What is most distressing about the cutting gate in
environmental law and policy is that it seems to prevent the
emergence of a strong, effective lobbying force for a sensible
middle ground. Public opinion seems overwhelmingly to favor
both environmental protection as a national goal' 0' and fiscal
prudence in the effectuation of that goal. 10 2 Yet few if any
99. DONALD BRAMAN & DAN M. KAHAN, MORE STATISTICS, LESS
PERSUASION: A CULTURAL THEORY OF GUN-RISK PERCEPTIONS 30 (Public Law
& Legal Theory Working Paper, 2001), http://www.law.uchicago.edu/academics
/circulation5.pdf (emphasis added) (last visited Mar. 2, 2003).
100. FARBER, supra note 16, at 201.
101. See Daniel A. Farber, Environmental Protection as a Learning
Experience, 27 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 791, 792-93 (1994) (reviewing evidence that
"the goals of environmental law" are "deeply entrenched").
102. See FARBER, supra note 16, at 200 ("Economic growth is not something
we are prepared to abandon in the name of environmental protection."). While
Farber also presents evidence that would seem to cast doubt on this claim (see
id. at 2, citing survey evidence in which 80 percent of respondents agreed that
"[pirotecting the environment is so important that regulations and standards
cannot be too high, and continuing environmental improvements must be
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advocacy organizations are able to seize that middle ground
with success. Instead, their voices seem at great risk of being
lost amidst the shrill tribal cacophony of tree huggers and bean
counters, which often simply drowns out the call for ecopragmatic approaches. Because of the dynamics described in
the preceding sections, complex, uncertain, and value-laden
issues frequently are presented to the public in terms that are
unduly reductionist, absolutist, or lacking in candor. Global
climate change, for instance, is often said to threaten dire
consequences, without attention to the likelihood and
confidence limits surrounding such possibilities.1 0 3 In turn, the
Kyoto Protocol is said to require rolling back the standard of
living, without explanation as to what assumptions are driving
that conclusion or, indeed, what the "standard of living"
measures and excludes.10 4 Other examples of poorly framed
10 5
environmental issues abound.
To some extent, such advocacy strategies simply reflect the
shortcomings of an information-rich, deliberation-poor public
forum. 10 6

As described above in regard to adversarial policy

made regardless of cost"), the rapid death of Clinton's proposed carbon tax
provided pretty clear evidence that green talk is cheap.
103. See FARBER, supra note 16, at 177-78 (describing the disjunction
between the highly publicized catastrophic risks of climate change and the
extent of scientific knowledge regarding such risks).
104. Consistent with that approach, Lomborg recently offered a New York
Times editorial, entitled "The Environmentalists Are Wrong," in which he
attempted to summarize the mind-boggling complexity of global climate
change in four precious columns of text. See Bjorn Lomborg, Editorial, The
Environmentalists Are Wrong, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 26, 2002, at A15. His
conclusion is that "[d]espite our intuition that we need to do something drastic
about global warming, economic analyses show that it will be far more
expensive to cut carbon dioxide emissions radically than to pay the costs of
adapting to the increased temperatures." Id. What Lomborg failed to disclose
is that the expense of cutting carbon dioxide emissions includes the
opportunity cost of foregone Ford Excursions, and the costs of adaptation
include the premature expiration of thousands of future human lives,
particularly in the developing world, both of which have been valued by
Lomborg's "economic analyses" in a manner that deserves inspection and
debate. See Kysar, supra note 52, at 44-51. Put differently, there is a moral
discussion to be had here, one that seems at risk of being lost amidst
competing strategies of alarmism and reductionism.
105. See, e.g., Rebecca Bratspies, The Illusion of Care: Regulation,
Uncertainty,and Genetically Modified Food Crops, 10 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 297,
298 (2002) (noting that debate over genetically modified organisms is
characterized by the "rhetorical excesses of a 'new green revolution' and
'Frankenstein foods").
106. See KRAFT, supra note 64, at 17 ("Unfortunately, contemporary
politics has created a demand for simple ideas expressed in news conference
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making, 10 7 under such conditions, fundraising, constituency
building, and other aspects of political entrepreneurship may in
fact be pursued most effectively by reducing complex scientific
issues to simplistic stories of good versus evil (i.e., publicspirited environmentalists versus greed-infused multinational
corporations). 0 8 In a parallel fashion, business interests often
stand to gain more by portraying environmental causes as
excessively
romantic,
scientifically
unfounded,
and
diametrically opposed to national welfare than they do by
engaging publicly in a balanced, reasoned assessment of social
options.1 0 9
Unfortunately, mass media presentation of
environmental issues rarely delves below these symmetric
sound bite strategies." 0 Poised between these extremes, ecopragmatic proposals become vulnerable to double-demonization
by tree huggers and bean counters alike, undermining their
ability to persuade a public that otherwise might be quite
receptive.'
The result is a public that is deeply, but
understandably, confused about the state of environmental
quality in the early twenty-first century, about the relationship
sound bites and an impatience to work through complex scientific issues and
tough policy choices."); Roger A. Pielke, Jr., Policy, Politics and Perspective:
The Scientific Community Must Distinguish Analysis from Advocacy, 416
NATURE 367, 368 (2002) ("Science is becoming yet another playing field for
power politics, complete with the trappings of media spin and a win-at-allcosts attitude. Sadly, much of what science can offer policy-makers, and hence
society, is being lost.").
107. See supra text accompanying notes 38-40.
108. See Zywicki, supra note 96, at 17 ("Because bigger scares lead to
bigger contributions, scaring the public is an effective mechanism for
environmental activists to build their war chests and to sustain their
organizations.").
109. Cf. FARBER, supra note 16, at 35 ("Economists consider
environmentalists to be hopeless romantics, eager to pursue their own
personal values without heeding the cost to society.").
110. As Kraft notes,
[S]cientific uncertainties often are exploited to strengthen particular
positions on the issues. Highly vocal critics of environmentalists,
from scientists such as Richard Lindzen and S. Fred Singer to
conservative talk show host Rush Limbaugh, fire polemical
broadsides at their adversaries on climate change issues. From their
perspective, environmentalists are guilty of "inflammatory claims,"
"doomsday rhetoric," and "environmental overkill." These exchanges
are intriguing but rarely enlightening, and they often confuse both
the scientific and policy issues.
KRAFr, supra note 64, at 17.
111. Cf. J.B. Ruhl, Is the Endangered Species Act Eco-Pragmatic?, 87
MINN. L. REV. 885, 889 (2003) ("[E]co-pragmatism finds few friends in the
conventional opposing camps of environmental policy.").
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between present action and future environmental quality, 1and
2
about the possibilities and limits of government regulation.'
For a variety of reasons, therefore, public advocacy in
environmental debates often does not allow the lay observer to
identify what the relevant tradeoffs are, where the
uncertainties lie, and what corresponding policy proposals best
resonate with her individual values. Farber's brand of ecopragmatism, on the other hand, seems directed at achieving
precisely that type of intellectual candor. Recognizing the
futility of attempting to resolve ultimate philosophical issues,
Farber instead advocates an eclectic, pluralistic approach that
attempts to resolve disputes by inviting the expression of
multiple values, perspectives, and concerns. Such an approach
makes good sense. After all, bean counters are correct that the
public's demand for environmental, health, and safety
regulation is sometimes based on poor information or cognitive
error. 113 Simultaneously, tree huggers also are correct that
narrow forms of cost-benefit analysis ignore legitimate public
values.11 4 Presumably, responsible policy makers would wish
neither to give effect to ill-informed fears nor to enshrine moral
obtuseness. As Farber puts it, "[I]n reality, both market and
political mechanisms have flaws as expression of the public
interest. The real question is not whether to follow one while
ignoring the other, but how to make the best use of both to
11 5
guide public policy."
This contention strikes us as fundamentally sound, but we
doubt whether such an eco-pragmatic approach can
successfully be heard in a marketplace of ideas dominated by
environmental tribalism. We are not so naive to think, for
instance, that an ethic of intellectual honesty will somehow
miraculously sweep through the channels of advocacy to alter
Nor do we expect
the American political marketplace.
fit
of group hugs and
environmental tribalism to vanish in a
tearful acknowledgment that competing creeds are both
relevant and significant to environmental policy making.
Rather, we believe that the various dynamics we have
described that drive environmental tribalism are related to
structural features of our democracy and our culture that go
112. See FARBER, supra note 16, at 72 (observing that "[i]n reality, most
people's feelings are a confused mixture of tree hugger and bean counter").
113. See supra text accompanying notes 46-53.
114. See supra text accompanying notes 54-56.
115. FARBER, supra note 16, at 42.
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beyond the framework of environmental law and policy. To be
sure, public understanding of environmental issues would
benefit tremendously from a general program of ecological
literacy, 116 as well as from a commitment to government
funding of independent scientific research and its public
dissemination. Environmental issues are especially, perhaps
uniquely, prone to cutting gate dynamics given their
combination of complex and uncertain scientific information
with policy decisions that must somehow choose among
competing values and worldviews. It is therefore no surprise
that communication of scientific knowledge by advocacy groups
and mass media provides a recipe for polarization and
confusion.
We could go on in this vein, but recounting a wish list of
deliberation-enhancing changes to our democratic structure
serves little immediate practical purpose, however desirable
such changes may be in the abstract. 1 7 Above all, we wish to
be pragmatic concerning the problems facing eco-pragmatism.
The question therefore becomes strategic: Where can one most
effectively further the goals of eco-pragmatism? Given the
preceding analysis, the answer seems to us fairly obvious: It
must be below the public advocacy level. While a crude model,
one can think of environmental policy formation as a two-level
game, acted out at one level by the public advocacy debate and,
at a less visible level, by practical debates of implementation
within the agencies, congressional committees, and other
government bodies charged with regulatory design,
enforcement, and oversight, as well as among the various nonstate actors that remain interested and active beyond the
public advocacy level (the so-called "players"). We believe that
cycle that one might
it is at this second stage of the policy
18
expect eco-pragmatism to flourish. 8
116. In this regard, it is interesting to note that in Australia (where Jim
Salzman is spending the year), a country with relatively strong environmental
groups, publication of Lomborg's book was very much a non-event, hardly
raising a ripple of protest or notice. Perhaps this is because there is strong
general agreement across Australia over the magnitude of environmental
challenges the country faces, from loss of biodiversity and ozone depletion to

salinity and soil loss.
117. For a thorough, insightful survey of much of the relevant political
theory literature, see Christopher H. Schroeder, Deliberative Democracy's
Attempt to Turn Politics into Law, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 2002, at

95.
118. See Farber, supra note 37, at 872 ("Given that polarization is such a
major problem in environmental law, one particularly important avenue for
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Indeed, to some extent, eco-pragmatism already has begun
to take hold in precisely this manner. As we alluded to earlier,
if one looks at standard setting, zoning decisions, and many
other instances of environmental policy implementation, one
often finds bureaucrats and hostile advocates adopting creative
interpretations of statutes or other discretionary methods to
avoid extremist results." 19 Moreover, there seems to be
widespread support among various interested parties for.
innovative "radical middle" programs such as the increased use
of Habitat Conservation Plans under the Endangered Species
Act during the Clinton administration. 120
Accordingly,
considerable academic momentum has gathered behind the
prospect of formalizing such regulatory "reinvention" by
replacing traditional combative, adversarial rule-making
proceedings with innovative, cooperative approaches that
presumably would be more conducive to pragmatic decision
21
making.1
Thus the target audience for appeals to eco-pragmatic
decision making may well be neither the Greenpeaces of the
world, nor the Competitive Enterprise Institutes, nor even the
general public. Although we are emboldened by the fiery words
of Ruhl's "Manifesto for the Radical Middle" 122 and Farber's
persuasive arguments for eco-pragmatism, we remain
progress is to defuse the conflicts by finding implementation methods that
accommodate competing concerns.").
119. See Daniel A. Farber, Taking Slippage Seriously: Noncompliance and
Creative Compliance in Environmental Law, 23 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 297,
305-09 (1999).
120. See Farber, supra note 40, at 64-65 (describing the success of Habitat
Conservation Plans); Ruhl, supra note 111, at 890 (stating that Bruce Babbitt,
Secretary of the Department of the Interior and a chief architect of the
increased use of Habitat Conservation Plans is "the most valuable ecopragmatist of the 20th century").

121. As Farber puts it, "[r]einvention [of the regulatory process] is all the
rage today." Farber, supra note 40, at 61. Farber introduces three different

strands of the emerging reconceptualization of the regulatory process: selfregulatory efforts by firms; multilateral negotiation among firms, regulators,
and other interested parties; and a bilateral model in which firms and

regulators negotiate while other interested parties assume a more limited,
watchdog role. See id. at 62.
122. In Ruhl's own words,
I have in mind an aggressive middle. An aggressive middle-what I
will call, for purposes of rallying the troops, the radicalmiddle-is a

bully in its own right. It not only refuses to compromise its
compromise position, it also roughs up anyone it thinks might dare to
do so. It comes out swinging. It fights dirty too. It has passion.
Radical Middle, supra note 20, at 387.
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pessimistic about the prospects for such approaches to take
hold in the public forum or as a broad movement. Instead, we
believe it is primarily where the rubber meets the road-the
actual implementation of environmental policy-that fertile
ground for balanced, pragmatic policy development lies.
Fittingly, we would expect the cutting gate and tribalism to be
weaker dynamics here for the simple reason that regulators are
formally insulated from the public forum and majoritarian
demands.
As Farber indicated in his contribution to this
Symposium, 123 an important example of such a pragmatic
implementation discussion may be found in the current debate
over the use of cost-benefit analysis. Despite their awareness
of the limitations of cost-benefit analysis (including those
associated with valuation, monetization, discounting and other
analytical techniques that have proven philosophically divisive
in the environmental, health, and safety context), an increasing
1 24
number of influential scholars, including Kenneth Arrow,
Cass Sunstein, 125 Matthew Adler and Eric Posner, 126 and others
have argued in favor of particular, tailored uses of cost-benefit
analysis in public decision making. Many of these scholars
have advocated "modest, nonsectarian" 127 brands of cost-benefit
analysis that encourage regulators and other implementers of
public policy to undertake "a full accounting of the

123. See Farber, supra note 37, at 871 (noting that "the debate over costbenefit analysis has now begun to focus more on its institutional
implementation, a topic that lends itself to more reasoned and constructive
debate than the earlier battles over the morality of the technique").
124. See, e.g., Kenneth J. Arrow et al., Is There a Role for Cost-Benefit
Analysis in Environmental, Health, and Safety Regulation?, 272 SCIENCE 221
(1996); Kenneth J. Arrow & Robert C. Lind, Uncertainty and the Evaluation of
Public Investment Decisions, 60 AM. ECON. REV. 364, 366-67 (1970).
125.

See, e.g., CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE COST-BENEFIT STATE: THE FUTURE

OF REGULATORY PROTECTION (2002); Richard H. Pildes & Cass R.Sunstein,
Reinventing the Regulatory State, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (1995); Cass R.
Sunstein, Cognition and Cost-Benefit Analysis, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 1059 (2000);
Cass R. Sunstein, Cost-Benefit Default Principles, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1651
(2001).
126. See, e.g., Matthew D. Adler & Eric A. Posner, Implementing CostBenefit Analysis When Preferences Are Distorted, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 1105
(2000); Matthew D. Adler & Eric A. Posner, Rethinking Cost-Benefit Analysis,
109 YALE L.J. 165 (1999).
127. ROBERT W. HAHN & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, A NEW ExECUTIvE ORDER
FOR IMPROVING FEDERAL REGULATION? DEEPER AND WIDER COST-BENEFIT

ANALYSIS 7 (Chicago-John M. Olin Law & Economics Working Paper No. 150,
2d Series, 2002).
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consequences of an action, in both quantitative and qualitative
terms,"' 28 without binding themselves to the results like
dogmatic mathematicians. For instance, Farber's proposal for
limited use of cost-benefit analysis as a tool for identifying
when the costs of avoiding environmental harm are "grossly
disproportionate to any benefit," 29 bears precisely this tone.
Significantly, because the debate over cost-benefit analysis has
taken place largely beneath the radar screen of public
environmental policy discussions, one would expect ecopragmatic voices such as Farber's to have their best chance of
succeeding on a topic just like this. Thoughtful critics of costbenefit analysis continue to identify conceptual, ethical, and
practical problems with the practice, 130 and it remains to be
seen how successfully eco-pragmatism's more nuanced,
inclusive, and cautious prescriptions for cost-benefit analysis
will influence its application. We are guardedly optimistic,
though, given that the regulators and other parties who
conduct cost-benefit analyses are "behind the scenes," largely
removed from the polarizing dynamics that characterize public
environmental advocacy.
Make no mistake, the level of public debate remains
critically important in setting priorities and shaping initiatives.
Indeed, absent a powerful "radical middle" it may well be that
extremism is necessary at the level of public advocacy in order
to ensure that we ultimately end up in a sensible middle
As Brad
ground at the level of policy implementation.
Karkkainen's contribution to this Symposium makes clear,
when environmental policy goals are set deliberately high, they
may induce cooperative, information-sharing approaches to
implementation by affected parties.131
As Farber has noted, however, the fact that the system
somehow finds a way of working things out is not, in itself, a
vote of confidence.1 32 Indeed, a major goal of eco-pragmatism is
specifically to move beyond the environmental policy "mish-

128. Id.
129. See FARBER, supra note 16, at 131.
130. For one powerful recent critique, see Frank Ackerman & Lisa
Heinzerling, Pricing the Priceless: Cost-Benefit Analysis of Environmental
Protection, 150 U. PENN. L. REV. 1553 (2002).
131. See Bradley C. Karkkainen, Adaptive Management and Regulatory
Penalty Defaults: Toward a Bounded Pragmatism,87 MINN. L. REV. 943, 97583 (2003).
132. FARBER, supra note 16, at 11.
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mash that neither of the warring sides wanted and the middle
had no hand in crafting."' 33 In realizing this goal, we suggest
that such mish-mash is an unavoidable consequence of the way
in which political advocacy is conducted at the turn of the
twenty-first century. No matter how widely supported by the
public in theory, eco-pragmatism and the radical middle will
find it hard going in the national public debate. As we
described in Part II, for reasons of institutional design,
psychology, and political economy, the cutting gate is alive and
well in public environmental debates, neatly herding advocates
into pens, strengthening the tribal behavior of tree huggers and
bean counters alike, and blocking the emergence of a prominent
middle force. Thus, rather than trying to dismantle the cutting
gate of public advocacy, eco-pragmatists may be better served
by focusing their efforts at the level of policy implementation
where such efforts are more likely to be heard and acted upon.

133. Radical Middle, supra note 20, at 387.
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